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This paper assesses the effect of key demographic changes (population ageing and 
upskilling) that are expected by 2030 on the income distribution in the EU-27 and examines 
the potential of tax-benefit systems to counterbalance negative developments. Theory 
predicts that population ageing should increase income inequality, while the effect of 
up-skilling is more ambiguous. Tax-benefit systems may stabilize these expected changes 
though this is largely an empirical question given their typically complex nature. We use 
a decomposition technique to isolate the effect of projected demographic change on 
income inequality and poverty from the reaction of the labor market to this demographic 
change through wage adjustments. Our results show that demographic change is likely to 
lead to increasing inequality while related wage adjustments work mainly in the opposite 
direction. Changes to projected relative poverty are minimal for most countries. With a few 
exceptions, EU tax-benefit systems are able to absorb most of projected increase in market 
income inequality. 
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1 Introduction
The labor markets and public finances of EU member states are facing serious challenges
from expected demographic changes over the course of the next few decades. Two long-
term trends — population ageing and upskilling — increasingly contribute to employment
dynamics (OECD, 2014, p.20). These will also shape household income distributions and
are likely to have profound effects on income inequalities and poverty levels. Inequality
and, to a lesser extent, relative poverty have been increasing in most OECD countries
from the mid-1980s to the Great Recession (To´th, 2014).
Several theoretical studies have shown that a larger share of older people tends to
increase overall income inequality (e.g Deaton, 1997; von Weizsa¨cker, 1988, 1995). This
is for several reasons. According to life cycle theory, within-cohort earnings inequality
increases as cohort members get older due to the cumulative effect of different levels
of human capital investment and learning abilities on incomes over the life course. The
ageing of the workforce alone, therefore, results in less equally distributed (cross-sectional)
earnings. A greater share of retired people increases population income inequality further
due to the fact that retirees have lower incomes compared to workers. An increased
proportion of pensioners also puts the public provision of pensions under pressure, more so
if productivity growth is not sufficient to compensate for a shrinking workforce.1 Further
interaction effects with labor markets as a shrinking working population, other things
being equal, is likely to put upward pressures on wage levels. A call by von Weizsa¨cker
(1996) for more theoretical and, in particular, empirical research on the distributional
implications of ageing appears still valid today.
Upskilling will also lead to an increase in average earnings, provided that the larger
supply of better educated workers can be absorbed by the economy.2 The effect of skill
upgrading on earnings inequality, however, is ambiguous, depending on the dynamics of
the high-skilled wage premium, among other factors. (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2015).
However, the empirical evidence for the OECD and EU countries to date indicates that
upskilling has not led to increased wage inequality over the last few decades (Fo¨rster and
To´th, 2015, p.1801).
There are few other studies which make projections about future labor markets and/or
income distributions. Aziz et al. (2015) use demographic projections combined with a
reweighting approach to analyze the effect of demographic change on income distributions
in New Zealand in 2010–2060 but abstract from any related wage changes. Their results
point to a small increase in market income inequality, while the inequality of disposable
1 von Weizsa¨cker (1995) also demonstrates that considering the type of funding arrangements and
reactions to avoid fiscal deficits can introduce some ambiguity regarding the effect of ageing on the
income distribution.
2 CEDEFOP (2012) forecasts for 2020 show trends towards more skill-intensive jobs together with
upskilling, though with scope for mismatches.
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income is stable or decreasing (depending on the measure). They also show that overall
and child poverty rates can be expected to decrease by up to 5 percentage points. This
illustrates the redistributive capacity of the tax-benefit system in New Zealand. Edwards
and Lange (2013) model the US labor force in 2030 and show how returns to education
as well as the gender wage gap will be affected by demographic change. Their key finding
is that the trend in demand towards more skilled (female) labor will continue to outstrip
supply despite rapid increases in the latter. This will lead to a continuation of the increase
in the wage skill premium.
The relevance of population ageing and upskilling is likely to be different across coun-
tries (OECD, 2014), which, given theoretical ambiguities, highlights the importance of
(comparative) empirical work. It is even more important to anticipate such influences at
an early stage, in the context of distributional targets such as Europe-2020 (European
Commission, 2010).
This study builds on Dolls et al. (2017), which studies the effect of demographic
changes between 2010 and 2030 on labor force participation and government budgets. In
this paper, we go beyond fiscal measures and assess how income distributions in the EU
are likely to be affected by future demographic changes such as population ageing and
upskilling. We examine the potential of current tax-benefit systems in the EU-27 to cope
with such changes, showing the implications of each tax-benefit system for future poverty
and inequality.
Our study is related to that of Aziz et al. (2015) for New Zealand in that we employ
reweighting and microsimulation techniques to account for projected demographic changes
between 2010 and 2030. We extend their method by also modeling labor market reactions
to these population changes through wage adjustments, and assess their combined effect
on the income distribution of the EU-27. To the best of our knowledge, no study has
attempted this before. We also show the effect of demographic change separately from the
effect of wage adjustment to this demographic change, drawing on the approach of Bargain
and Callan (2010) to decompose changes in the income distribution. The microsimulation
method (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006) allows us to simulate projected demographic
changes and model wage reactions, and, by holding everything else constant, to isolate
their respective impacts.
We rely on two sets of demographic and skills projections, an optimistic and a pes-
simistic scenario, from Huisman et al. (2013) which make different assumptions about
fertility, life-expectancy, educational attainment, migration and household formation.
The two main trends driving changes in the composition of the work force are popu-
lation ageing and the upskilling of the population. Our method of constructing future
income distributions involves, in the first stage, reweighting to make currently observed
household-level data reflect future population structures. In the second stage, we obtain
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new partial labor-market equilibrium wage levels by combining changes in the work force
resulting from demographic changes with existing detailed estimates of labor demand and
labor supply elasticities in the literature. To calculate household disposable incomes, we
employ EUROMOD — the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model — which uses EU-
SILC data on household demographic and labor market characteristics as well as market
incomes for nationally representative samples of households as input.
Our results suggest that demographic change is likely to lead to increasing income
inequality while related wage adjustments tend to work in the opposite direction. The
combined effect results in a modest increase in income inequality in the EU as a whole,
although cross-country differences in this effect can be expected. We also find that inequal-
ity is more likely to increase in countries which currently have relatively low inequality
levels, potentially leading to a convergence in inequalities at the EU level. Results for
relative poverty are more ambiguous with most countries experiencing little or no change
in relative poverty. However, for some countries, policy changes may be needed to keep
poverty and inequality at acceptable levels.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology: how demo-
graphic projections were obtained and linked with the income distribution, the frame-
work for estimating adjustments in the labor market through labor supply and demand
responses and the decomposition method to assess the effects of demographic change on
the income distribution. Section 3 discusses the main demographic trends and the new
equilibrium in the future labor market. Section 4 presents our findings on how these
developments affect the income distributions in the EU countries. Section 5 discusses the
stabilizing properties of tax-benefit systems in the EU-27. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Tax-Benefit Calculator
We use EUROMOD as a basis for our analysis. EUROMOD is a static tax-benefit calcula-
tor for the EU countries, which allows for comparative analysis of tax-benefit systems and
their impact on the income distribution in a consistent way through a common framework
(Sutherland and Figari, 2013). Based on a representative household sample of with infor-
mation about their socio-demographic and labor market characteristics as well as market
incomes (e.g. earnings), EUROMOD simulates disposable income for each household by
applying a set of tax-benefit rules. The latter can refer to existing tax-benefit systems
or (user-specified) reform scenarios. EUROMOD has become a heavily applied tool in
inequality research.3
3 For recent examples, see Bargain et al., 2017, Figari et al., 2017, Paulus et al., 2017.
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EUROMOD input-data are mainly based on the European Union Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat, or its national counter-
parts, where available and when they provide more detailed information. Each country
component of the model is thoroughly validated with results documented in a Country
Report.4
We use version F6.0 of EUROMOD with input datasets based primarily on the SILC
2008 wave (2007 wave is used for France and 2009 wave for Malta) and the Family Re-
sources Survey 2008/09 for the UK. The sample size for each country varies from about 10
thousand individuals for Luxembourg and Cyprus to more than 50 thousand individuals
for Italy and the UK.
Our analysis focuses on changes in the distribution of household disposable income,
equivalised to account for household size and composition by using the modified OECD
equivalence scale. Disposable income, as widely used to measure poverty and inequality, is
defined as all household incomes net of taxes and social contributions and after the receipt
of all types of cash benefits. Household market income (or original income) refers to the
total amount of labor income (excluding employer social insurance contributions), capital
income, private pensions and private transfers, i.e. income before taxes and benefits.
2.2 Projections and reweighting
We rely on the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute’s (NIDI) demographic
projections (Huisman et al., 2013) to adjust our micro data such that they reflect pop-
ulation characteristics of the year 2030 (similar to Dolls et al. (2017)). The population
projections are based on two different scenarios which are labeled as ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’,
making different assumptions about international and internal migration, educational at-
tainment, life expectancy and fertility. Both scenarios predict that ageing will be the
main demographic trend in the next decades leading to lower growth rates of the working
age population and higher dependency ratios, with the tough scenario reflecting more
pessimistic assumptions about demographic developments and greater challenges for Eu-
ropean policy makers. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a short overview of the main
features of both scenarios.
The demographic projections include joint distributions of age, sex, level of educa-
tional attainment and household position for the EU-27 until 2030.5 We incorporate
these projections into our representative European household micro data by a reweight-
4 See https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports.
5 A cohort component model is used to project the age and sex distribution while education projections
are based on KC et al. (2010). A comparison of the NIDI population projections by skill level to those of
the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), which provides an EU-wide
population projection for 2020, shows that the two are well aligned in terms of headcounts (CEDEFOP,
2012).
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ing procedure.6 Our baseline micro data contain personal weights for each individual in
our sample in order to adjust for sample design and/or differential non-response. Every
country data set is thus representative for the respective population in the base year (i.e.
2008). In a first step, we alter the weights such that they reflect the population size and
structure in 2010, keeping labor market conditions constant. This ensures that changes
in population characteristics between 2010 and 2030 are solely due to the underlying pop-
ulation scenarios and not caused by potential inconsistencies between our country-level
data sources. In a second step, we reweight the 2010 samples such that they precisely
reflect the characteristics of each EU population in terms of age, educational attainment
and household structure as projected for the year 2030.7
2.3 Linking labor supply and demand
Our implementation of the supply-demand link (described in more detail in Dolls et al.
(2017)) defines twelve distinct labor markets in each country, differentiated by marital
status, gender, and skill level. This ensures a flexible adjustment process as it incorporates
the main sources of heterogeneous labor market behavior. Aggregate labor supply is
modeled using a rich set of intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities from Bargain
et al. (2014) along these dimensions. The elasticities account for the fixed costs of work,
labor market restrictions within countries or even states, preference heterogeneity with
respect to age, the presence and number of children as well as unobserved heterogeneity
components. Table 2 reports aggregated (total) gross wage labor supply elasticities for
the different country groups.
While estimates for males in couples are very similar across country groups and skill
levels (mostly just under 0.1), elasticities for other population groups range from about
0.1 to 0.5 (reaching even 0.65 for single males). Differences between skill groups are more
pronounced for single males and females with low-skilled workers having the highest labor
supply elasticities, followed by high-skilled workers, while those with medium skills have
the lowest elasticities. Men tend to be slightly more responsive on the extensive margin,
the opposite holds for women. Overall, elasticities for the Eastern European countries
are among the lowest, while those for the Anglo-Saxon and Southern country groups are
among the highest.
6 Cf. Deville and Sa¨rndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). Technically, we apply the Stata package
survwgt, which proportionally adjusts sample weights to meet the target size in a respective stratification.
For an application of sample reweighting in the context of tax-benefit microsimulation, see Cai et al.
(2006). For applications of reweighting techniques in a different context — modeling an increase in
unemployment — see Immervoll et al. (2006) and Dolls et al. (2012).
7 The household position is differentiated between singles, single parents, children living at home,
couples without children, couples with children and other. Our analysis concentrates on differences
between 2010 and 2030 and ignores intermediate developments.
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The demand side is modelled using wage elasticities obtained from the meta-regression
analysis in Lichter et al. (2015). They account for differences in skills, labor market
institutions as well as the importance of specific sectors across countries. The variation
within countries comes from skill differences leading us to two labor demand elasticities
per country grouping (high/medium skilled vs low skilled), as reported in the lower part of
Table 2. These elasticities are extrapolated to 2030, making use of a linear time trend in
the meta-analysis. The resulting demand elasticities for 2030 are highest for the Eastern
and Anglo-Saxon countries (-0.7 to -0.9). As Eastern European countries tend to have
less strict laws concerning hiring and separations, this causes lower adjustment costs for
firms and may increase incentives to adjust labor demand in response to wage changes.
Demand elasticities for the other country/skill groups range between -0.5 and -0.6, and
are generally higher for the low-skilled.
Figure 1: Linking Labor Supply and Demand
E1 E0
w0
w1
LS2010
LS2030
LD2010
LD2030
A
B
C
Employment
W
ag
e
Source: Dolls et al., 2017. Notes: The figure shows an example in which both the labor force and the
population shrink between 2010 and 2030.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic mechanism of our supply-demand-link. Starting with the
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equilibrium point A in 2010, a decrease in the labor force due to demographic trends (as is
observed in many EU countries between 2010 and 2030), shifts the aggregate supply curve
to the left.8 In the absence of demand-side adjustments, the new equilibrium would be at
point B, resulting in a higher wage due to the higher scarcity of labor. A demand shift can
be expected due to the changing size of the population. As the population is projected
to change, the demand for goods and services can be expected to change accordingly,
leading to a lower or a higher demand for labor. This is represented, in the example in
Figure 1, by a downward shift of the demand curve which moves the equilibrium point
B to C. Point C denotes wage and employment level in the equilibrium. The resulting
relative wage change w1
w0
is fed back into the micro-data to obtain counterfactual individual
earnings for 2030. In order to account for different elasticities depending on the worker
type, this procedure is carried out separately for the 12 combinations of gender, couple
status and skill level within each country.
2.4 The decomposition method
We follow the decomposition framework in Bargain and Callan (2010) to decompose
changes in the income distribution. Their original application examined changes in actual
income distributions in France and Ireland. Further studies have applied it in the analysis
of changes in income distributions in the UK (Bargain, 2012a,b); in the US (Bargain et al.,
2015) and comparatively for a selection of European countries (Bargain et al., 2017; Hills
et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2017). Our paper provides the first application of this method
to future income distributions and covers the whole EU-27.
Denote y a matrix with household socio-demographic characteristics and market in-
come sources (with each row describing a single household). Let d denote the ‘tax-benefit
function’ which calculates household disposable income on the basis of household char-
acteristics, pre-tax and transfer incomes, and a set of tax-benefit policy parameters with
monetary values p (e.g., tax brackets, benefit amounts). We can then express the distri-
bution of disposable income for the population of year l, under the tax-benefit structure
of year i and the tax-benefit parameters of year j as di(p
j, yl). We will be focusing on dis-
tributional indices I (e.g. inequality, poverty), computed as a function of the (simulated)
distribution of disposable income, i.e. I
[
di(p
j, yl)
]
.
The total change in a given distributional index between two time periods, t = 0 (e.g.
2010) and t = 1 (e.g. 2030), can be written as
∆I = I
[
d1(p
1, y1)
]− I [d0(p0, y0)] (1)
8 Under the assumption of constant elasticities, any supply/demand curve can be fully characterized
by the elasticity and a single observed point of hours.
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This can be decomposed into a (direct) policy effect and changes in population character-
istics (including market incomes), using a (simulated) counterfactual income distribution
d0(α
1p0, y1) and α1 to adjust the nominal levels of policy parameters with monetary val-
ues.9
∆I =
{
I
[
d1(p
1, y1)
]− I [d0(α1p0, y1)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy effect
+
{
I
[
d0(α
1p0, y1)
]− I [d0(p0, y0)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
changes in characteristics
(2)
In this analysis, we consider two possible values for α1. The first, unity, reflects an
approach where the two components are assessed without indexing tax-benefit policy
parameters in the counterfactual scenario. More precisely, as wage adjustments presented
in the next section should be interpreted in 2010 levels, the policy parameters should be
understood as kept fixed in real terms for our benchmark. However, when incomes rise
faster than prices, the total number of taxpayers (and the number of higher-rate taxpayers)
increases. This phenomenon of bracket creep (Immervoll, 2005) is likely to affect the
final distribution of post-tax income. Therefore, we employ α1 equal to the change in
average market income between 2010 and 2030, i.e. it measures each component against
a scenario where tax-benefit policy parameters are indexed in line with developments in
market income.10 This approach allows an assessment of the effect of demographic change
by 2030 against a distributionally neutral benchmark. In what follows, we present only
results for α1 equal to this distributionally neutral factor but results for the decomposition
in which α1 = 1 are qualitatively similar. Note that the actual total change between 2010
and 2030 can only be assessed once micro-data become available for both periods and
2030 tax-benefit policy rules are known. Here we use projected 2030 market incomes
(in real terms), denoting the new population structure and market income distribution
after demographic changes (alone) as y1d. After wage adjustments, the distribution in the
new labor market equilibrium is denoted y1w. We seek to quantify changes in the income
distribution, on the basis of an α valued at the change in average market income:
∆Ic = I[d0(α
1p0, y1w)]− I[d0(p0, y0)] (3)
The last expression corresponds to the second term in equation (2), i.e. the effect of
changes in population characteristics on the income distribution.
We decompose this further to separate a demographic effect from a wage effect. The
9 Note that decomposition is path-dependent. Here we show only a version assessing policy effects
conditional on the end-period data.
10 Bargain and Callan (2010) argue that gross income inflation is a distributionally neutral factor
that seems most appropriate for such decomposition exercises. The choice of the uprating factor is also
discussed in Bargain (2012a).
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demographic effect shows the change in the disposable income distribution, which is due to
demographic change (population ageing, up-skilling, etc.), while the wage effect represents
the market reaction to this demographic change through labor demand (and subsequent
labor supply) adjustment. Simplifying d0 → d and p0 → p, and noting that α1 = α1wα1d,
the decomposition is presented as follows:
∆Ic =
{
I[d(α1p, y1w)]− I[d(α1dp, y1d)]
}
+
{
I[d(α1dp, y
1
d)]− I[d(p, y0)]
}
(4)
=
{
I[d(α1p, y1w)]− I[d(α1p, α1wy1d)]
}
(wage effect)
+
{
I[d(α1wα
1
dp, α
1
wy
1
d)]− I[d(α1dp, y1d)]
}
(income growth, w)
+
{
I[d(α1dp, y
1
d)]− I[d(α1dp, α1dy0)]
}
(demographic effect)
+
{
I[d(α1dp, α
1
dy
0)]− I[d(p, y0)]} (income growth, d) (5)
As tax-benefit functions, d(p, y), are usually linearly homogeneous in p and y, a simultane-
ous change in nominal levels of both market incomes and monetary tax-benefit parameters
should not affect the relative position of households in the distribution of disposable in-
come. The direct consequence of this is that the terms above capturing nominal changes
(the income growth effects) should be zero.11
Altogether there are five different simulated income distributions. d(p, y0) is simply the
distribution of disposable income in 2010.12 d(α1dp, y
1
d) and d(α
1p, y1w) correspond to the
distribution of disposable income after demographic changes, and, respectively, before and
after subsequent wage adjustments. Policy parameters with monetary values are adjusted
with α1d and α
1 = α1wα
1
d, respectively, to keep them in line with projected market income
changes. Finally, d(α1dp, α
1
dy
0) and d(α1wα
1
dp, α
1
wy
1
d), which are used to capture changes in
average income levels, are constructed on the basis of the 2010 distribution and the 2030
distribution (without wage adjustments), respectively, scaling both market incomes and
monetary parameters (with α1d and α
1
w, respectively). That is, α
1
dy
0 retains the structural
characteristics of the base year data (in particular, the distribution of market income)
but adopts the average income levels prevailing after demographic changes (and before
wage adjustments). In contrast, α1wy
1
d retains the structural characteristics of population
after demographic changes (and before wage adjustments) but adopts the income levels
prevailing after wage adjustments.
11This has been empirically checked for a number of European countries in Bargain and Callan (2010)
and Bargain et al., 2017
12 As the income reference period for the input datasets is either 2007 or 2009, market incomes have
first been updated to 2010 levels using appropriate factors for each income source, which reflect growth
in their average values.
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3 2030 population projections
3.1 Demographic changes
Table 3 describes projected changes to the population between 2010 and 2030. We see that
the total EU population in 2030 is projected to slightly decrease in the tough scenario (-
3%) and to increase in the friendly scenario (+8%). There are cross-country differences in
the effect with large population increases expected in both scenarios in Belgium, Cyprus,
Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Conversely, large decreases in the population are
projected for both scenarios in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia.
The EU projected total labor force (15–65 years of age), on the other hand, decreases
in both scenarios (Table 4), though magnitudes differ substantially: about -1% in the
friendly scenario and about -9% in the tough scenario. In the tough scenario, it decreases
in all countries except Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK. The projected
decreases are more drastic for Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) as well as for Germany. A declining work force relative
to the total population implies a growing scarcity of workers, which will put upward
pressures on wage levels as depicted in Figure 1. As the total population is projected to
decrease only slightly or even to increase, depending on the scenario, domestic demand
for goods and services is likely to change little or might even increase. This implies a
minimal or even rightward shift in the LD2010 curve in Figure 1. Hence, declining labor
force in both scenarios is likely to lead to structural problems as meeting this aggregate
demand will become more challenging.
One key development is the aging of the population. Figure 2 shows that the old-
age dependency ratio, calculated as the number of people over 65, divided by the size
of the labor force, is set to increase in every country by 2030. The black solid bar,
which represents the situation in 2010, shows that there is some heterogeneity in the
old-age dependency ratio across the EU-27. It ranges from 18% in Ireland to 31% in
Germany. The largest increases in this ratio are to be found in the countries with relatively
lower old-age dependency ratios in 2010, such as Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Poland and
Malta. These countries can expect the share of old-age dependents to increase by more
than 10 percentage points by 2030. Countries which already have large shares of old-
age dependents, such as Belgium, Sweden and Greece can expect more modest increases.
Overall, there seems to be some cross-country convergence in the old-age dependency
ratio.
Another important trend is the upskilling of the population in both scenarios (Table 5).
The share of highly skilled individuals among the population aged 15–64 is projected to
increase by 5–6 percentage points on average in the tough scenario and by about 11
percentage points in the friendly scenario, while the share of low skilled workers decreases
10
Figure 2: Old-age dependency ratio
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Source: Own calculations. Notes: Countries are ranked by their 2010 values in the ascending order.
by 5–8 percentage points on average, depending on the scenario. Germany, in the tough
scenario, is the only case where essentially no upskilling is taking place. Changes in
the share of medium skilled workers are more varied, decreasing more in the friendly
scenario. These patterns are consistent across countries but especially pronounced in
Cyprus, France, Lithuania and Poland.
3.2 Effects on wages and labor supply
The main insight from the previous subsection is that the workforce is ageing and be-
coming more skilled. This will affect real wage levels. First, as older (more educated)
workers have higher wages than younger (less educated) workers, there is a direct positive
effect of demographic change on average wages. Second, there will be wage changes due
to labor demand (LD) and (further) labor supply (LS) adjustments to the new population
structure. Taking these labor market responses into account, the high-skill premium can
be expected to decrease. These developments could affect overall average wages in either
direction.
Figure 3 shows projected changes in average real wages (i.e. measured in 2010 prices)
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Figure 3: Average wage changes due to demographic change and the labor market response
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Note: Own calculations. The average wage change shows the change in average wages for workers
between 2010 and 2030. This is decomposed into a demographic effect, which shows the effect of ageing,
up-skilling and other demographic changes on wages, ignoring the demand reaction, and a labor market
effect which shows the effect of the labor supply shift on wages taking demand side elasticities into
account.
in the tough and in the friendly scenario, distinguishing between the direct effect due
to demographic change and the effect due to wage adjustment to demographic change.
There is no clear correlation between the total change in the average wage (black bar) and
the change in the size of the work force (dark gray bar), indicating that the composition
of the projected workforce also plays an important role in determining wage reactions to
population change. In both scenarios, the changes in average wage range from an increase
of less than 5% in Hungary and Latvia to close to 20% in Germany, Spain and Austria.
In most countries, the first round effect of demographic change, i.e. ageing and upskilling,
drives most of the average wage change. However, countries such as Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Belgium, Sweden and Malta can also expect large
average wage changes due to the behavioral response to these demographic changes.
Underlying employment changes are presented in Table 6, showing the share of people
in the labor force working at least part-time in each scenario both before and after wage
adjustments. Unlike with wages, it is not clear a priori how demographic changes affect
employment levels directly before taking further labor market adjustments into account
as older people tend to work less while more educated people tend to work more. Overall,
we find rather small and positive changes in employment rates which are slightly higher
after accounting for wage adjustments, meaning that the wage increases implied by labor
shortages encourage more people (as a proportion of the active population) to work. This
implies that, although the total size of the labor force decreases substantially in most
countries (Table 4), the proportion of the labor force projected to work is, on average,
stable and this is partly due to wage adjustment.
Table 7 shows the total number of labor hours supplied by country in 2010 and in the
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two 2030 scenarios, before and after wage adjustment. Total hours of work are projected
to decrease substantially in most countries in the tough scenario. However, as the friendly
scenario projects just a small decrease in the size of the labor force and a slight increase
in employment rates, a slight increase in total hours of work is expected in this scenario.
In both scenarios, most of the movement comes from demographic change with just small
downward adjustments to average hours of work stemming from wage reactions.
4 Effects on income distribution
4.1 Income changes
We now turn our attention to the effect of demographic change and the accompanying
wage adjustment on the income distribution, measured against a benchmark where tax-
benefit policy parameters evolve in line with average market income.13 The increase in
household original income between 2010 and 2030, which is due solely to demographic
change, is denoted α1d (see Section 2.4), while the increase in household original income
between 2010 and 2030 which is attributable to wage adjustment corresponds to α1w.
Table 8 shows the magnitude of these income growth rates between 2010 and 2030 by
country.
With few exceptions, total income growth is positive between 2010 and 2030 (i.e.
α1 = α1dα
1
w is greater than 1). We generally see an income decline due to demographic
change (α1d < 1), which is driven by the large increase in the over-64 population with little
employment income. This dominates (direct) wage changes due to the increasing share
of older workers and upskilling. This effect is counteracted by strong income growth due
to wage adjustment (α1w > 1). There is a quite distinctive grouping of countries along
regions/welfare typologies. It is primarily Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
(together with Germany and Austria) which show the largest decrease in average original
income due to demographics (α1d), while Southern European countries (Portugal, Italy
and Greece) and Ireland exhibit the largest increases.14 The income growth rate due to
wage adjustment is highest in Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and
the UK. This can be mostly explained by higher average wages, resulting, among other
things, from relatively modest upskilling and thus lower downward pressure on wages of
high-skilled workers.
Hungary, Latvia and Malta, in turn, exhibit the most negative income changes. For
13 Using a benchmark where tax-benefit policy parameters are fixed in real terms does not alter our
conclusions. Results are available upon request.
14 Note also that countries which have been hit harder in the Great Recession tend to have the highest
α1d. This could imply that favourable (or less dramatic) demographic projections will allow them to catch
up with other countries to some extent.
13
Hungary and Latvia, this phenomenon can be explained by the projected negative trend
in average wages due to the projected change in the skill composition. Malta, in turn,
features the largest share of low-skilled workers, who realize modest income increases as
the skill composition changes. Other skill groups, in contrast, partly exhibit strongly
negative income changes, resulting in an overall negative effect.
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4.2 Impact on inequality and poverty
Figure 4: Projected inequality levels between 2010 and 2030 across the EU
Note: Own calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data reweighted to 2030 and adjusted for
wage reactions to demographic change. Gini coefficients calculated using equivalized disposable
household income. Graphs are sorted in ascending order by inequality levels in 2010. The underlying
figures can be found in Table 9 in the Appendix.
The projected impacts of demographic change on income inequality, measured by the
Gini coefficient, is depicted in Figure 4 for each EU-27 country. Detailed results are
provided in Table 9 in the Appendix. Complementary analyzes for the P90/P50 (which
compares the 90th decile of income to the 50th) and the P10/P50 ratio (which compares
the 10th decile of income to the 50th) can be found in Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix,
leading to similar quantitative conclusions. The circles in Figure 4 represent the baseline
levels of income inequality in 2010. The projected levels for 2030 before wage adjustment
are indicated by a cross and, after wage adjustment, by a diamond.
On average, European Gini coefficients are projected to increase modestly by 0.6%
(0.9%) in the tough (friendly) population scenario between 2010 and 2030. In the majority
of countries, the effect of population change before wage adjustment increases income
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Figure 5: Projected at risk of poverty levels between 2010 and 2030 across the EU
Note: Own calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data reweighted to 2030 and adjusted for
wage reactions to demographic change. Graphs are sorted in ascending order by poverty levels in 2010.
The underlying figures can be found in Table 12 in the Appendix.
inequality by 1–2 per cent. Higher average wages, however, work in the opposite direct
direction, partly counteracting this increase.
Considering the total effect of demographic change on the Gini coefficient, the most
affected countries are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Romania and Slovakia. In the case
of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Slovakia, inequality is projected to increase due to a
combination of demographic change and wage reactions. Conversely, Romania can expect
inequality to decrease for the same reason. This trend is confirmed in Table 10, which
decomposes the ratio of the 90th percentile of income to the 50th. This indicates that much
of the movement observed in the Gini index is due to increases (in the Nordic countries and
Slovakia) and decreases (in Romania) in inequality at the top of the income distribution.
Looking lastly at the detailed decomposition of the ratio of the 10th percentile of income
to the 50th in Table 10, we observe that some of the countries with small changes in
the Gini index are actually projected to have large increases/decreases in inequality at
the bottom of the income distribution. Increases in inequality at the bottom of the
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income distribution are projected for Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy and Romania while
decreases are noted for Spain, Malta and Slovakia.
The projected changes in risk-of-poverty rates by country, where risk-of-poverty is
defined as equivalised household disposable income of less than 60% of median income,
are visualized in Figures 5 and detailed in Table 12. Poverty ratios are projected to
slightly increase (decrease) in the tough (friendly) population scenario. These changes
are modest, rarely exceeding 5 percentage points where the baseline average is 16%.
Unlike inequality, these effects are driven by two reinforcing effects in both scenarios. On
average, both demographic and wage adjustments increase poverty in the tough scenario
and decrease it in the friendly scenario.
A couple of country cases deserve a closer look. We project substantial rises in relative
poverty for Ireland and Portugal in both scenarios. In Ireland, this increase is driven
purely by demographic change while, in Portugal, the increase is due to a combination
of demographic change and wage adjustment. We examine projections for the FGT(1)
index, the poverty gap, which goes beyond the headcount index by weighting very low
incomes higher than incomes just below the poverty threshold (Table 13). The poverty
gap is actually projected to decrease in Ireland, despite an increasing poverty headcount,
suggesting that a higher number of households find themselves just below the poverty
line in 2030, but not far below. The poverty headcount increase for Ireland should be
interpreted with this in mind. Portugal, in contrast, shows a strong increase in the poverty
gap as well as the poverty headcount, creating by far the most worrying country case in
the EU-27. Apart from these outliers, relative poverty is projected to undergo marginal
changes in most countries.
5 The stabilizing capability of European Tax-Benefit
Systems
The ability of European tax-benefit systems to stabilise income has been studied by Dolls
et al. (2012) who found that stabilisation of disposable incomes ranged from 25 per cent to
56 per cent of the overall change in market incomes. Stabilisation of income inequality has
also been studied and found to differ substantially from stabilisation of income (Callan
et al. (2018), Paulus and Tasseva (2018)). In this section, we consider the inequality
stabilization and redistributive capabilities of each of the tax-benefit systems in the EU-
27. To this end, Figure 6 contrasts changes in market income inequality, measured by
the Gini coefficient with changes in disposable income inequality between 2010 and 2030.
Several important findings emerge from this.
First, demographic changes alone (i.e. with constant wages) almost universally in-
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crease market income inequality both in the tough and in the friendly scenario, as the
theoretical literature on population ageing generally predicts. Inequality increasing ef-
fects are largest (up to 5 percentage points) in larger economies (France, Germany, Spain,
Italy) together with Austria, Finland and Slovenia. The UK and Ireland are on the other
side of the scale with almost no changes in demography-induced market inequality.
Figure 6: Changes in the Gini coefficient for market and disposable income
(a) Tough Scenario (constant wage)
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LULV
MTNL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SI
SK
UK
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 G
in
i (
D
is
po
sa
bl
e 
In
co
m
e)
-.05 0 .05 .1
Change in Gini (Market income)
(b) Friendly Scenario (constant wage)
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(c) Tough Scenario (with wage changes)
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(d) Friendly Scenario (with wage changes)
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Note: Own calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data for 2010, reweighted to 2030 and
adjusted for wage reactions to demographic change. The dashed line represents the linear fit.
Second, disposable income inequality, in contrast, increases much less or even de-
creases, indicating tax-benefit systems’ built-in capacity to absorb some of the ‘raw’ in-
equality increase. This is characteristic of all countries except for Portugal, where, basi-
cally, all changes in market income inequality translate into disposable income inequality.
This is due to the fact that, unlike most other countries, demographic change decreases
the share of low-income recipients in Portugal; the increase in inequality hence reflects
an overall income increase (see also Table 8). In relative terms, Spain and Cyprus seem
better equipped to withstand increases in market income inequality in either demographic
scenario.
Third, when taking into account wage adjustments, we find more heterogeneous out-
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comes in both market and disposable income inequality, with a substantial share of coun-
tries now displaying a decline in the Gini for market income. Finland, Denmark and
Slovakia are found among the countries with the least redistributive capacity in both
scenarios.
6 Conclusions
Given their tremendous impact on society, demographic changes are among the most
important policy challenges in the European Union. Population projections suggest that
ageing and shrinking labor forces will have important implications, not only for fiscal
revenue and social security systems, but also for the income distribution. While the
effect of a growing dependency ratio on fiscal sustainability, in particular with regard
to the financing of European welfare states, has been addressed by some contributions
in the literature (Dolls et al., 2017), very little is known about its effect on the income
distribution.
This paper is the first attempt to fill this gap. Theory predicts that population ageing
increases income inequality in the population as a whole due to, among other things,
increasingly divergent human capital and lower income towards the end of the lifecourse.
By contrast, the effect of upskilling on income inequality is ambiguous. We investigate
the ability of tax-benefit systems to stabilize these expected changes. We apply a decom-
position approach that enables us to separate the pure demographic effect from resulting
labor market effects on the income distribution in Europe in the year 2030. We rely on
detailed population projections for two different scenarios, ‘tough’ and ‘friendly’, contain-
ing joint distributions of age, sex, level of urbanization and educational attainment as
well as household structure. The scenarios can be interpreted as upper and lower bounds
for the severity of demographic change. We take the population projections to our har-
monized European micro data by applying a reweighting procedure. Our partial labor
market model, linking the resulting labor supply and demand responses, provides us with
new wage and employment changes leading to a new labor market equilibrium in each
member state. Implementing these steps sequentially, we are able to isolate the effect of
demographic change from the accompanying effect of wage adjustments.
Our analysis shows that the EU-27 average income inequality, measured by the Gini
coefficient, is projected to increase by 1–2 per cent due to demographic change. Our
results suggest that accompanying wage adjustments partly offset the increased inequality.
Notable increases in inequality are found for Scandinavian countries in particular, which
may lead to cross-country convergence in income inequality. Examining other measures
of inequality, we find that most of the increase is projected to occur in the top half of
the income distribution, whereas income inequality in the bottom half of the income
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distribution is projected to undergo only marginal changes. Results are more ambiguous
for relative poverty, which is projected to increase in the tough scenario but slightly
decrease in the friendly scenario. In general, projected changes in relative poverty are
small but there are some country exceptions such as Ireland and Portugal.
Two important general messages emerge. First, the challenges countries face vary and
not all will be exposed to a considerable increase in market income inequality. However,
among those who will, there are some tax-benefit systems better equipped to moder-
ate such increases than others. Second, tax-benefit systems cushion some of the in-
creases in market income inequality so that the increase in disposable income inequality
is smaller. Our paper shows that the size of these cushioning effects to a large extent
depends on whether we consider the (direct) demographic effect only or also the resulting
wage changes. This highlights the importance of accounting for labor market adjustments
in an analysis such as the present one.
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Appendix
Table 1: Assumptions underlying the population scenarios
Scenario
tough friendly
International migration low high
Rural-to-urban migration high low
Fertility low high
Increase in life expectancy low high
GDP growth low high
Educational attainment low high
Note: See Huisman et al. (2013) for more details on the demo-
graphic projections.
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Table 2: Labor Supply and Labor Demand Elasticities
Skill Level
High Medium Low
Labor supply elasticities
Single Male
Continental 0.15 0.11 0.23
Nordic 0.27 0.21 0.34
UK/IRL 0.46 0.14 0.65
Southern 0.27 0.18 0.27
Eastern 0.15 0.17 0.24
Single Female
Continental 0.23 0.14 0.38
Nordic 0.19 0.11 0.36
UK/IRL 0.32 0.20 0.51
Southern 0.26 0.29 0.48
Eastern 0.09 0.10 0.24
Married Male
Continental 0.09 0.08 0.10
Nordic 0.11 0.09 0.14
UK/IRL 0.09 0.06 0.11
Southern 0.06 0.08 0.07
Eastern 0.08 0.08 0.08
Married Female
Continental 0.28 0.30 0.27
Nordic 0.18 0.17 0.22
UK/IRL 0.20 0.23 0.19
Southern 0.40 0.49 0.36
Eastern 0.11 0.12 0.11
Labor demand elasticities
Continental -0.53 -0.62
Nordic -0.48 -0.55
UK/IRL -0.66 -0.92
Southern -0.58
Eastern -0.66
Note: Supply Elasticities based on estimations from Bargain et al. (2014). The
values refer to the mean value by country group. Where possible, elasticities
are country-specific. If a specific country is not covered in Bargain et al. (2014),
it is assigned the mean value within the country group. Demand elasticities are
from Lichter et al. (2015), by adding an interaction between skill and country
group to the main specification and setting the time trend to 2030. Due to
insufficient empirical estimates, skill groups for the demand side had to be
partly aggregated.
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Table 3: Projected Total Population
Million People % Change
Country Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 8.4 8.3 9.1 -1.2 8.7
BE 10.8 11.7 12.5 8.1 15.1
BG 7.6 5.8 7.2 -22.9 -4.5
CY 0.8 0.9 1.0 10.4 23.9
CZ 10.5 10.1 11.2 -3.8 6.5
DE 81.8 72.3 80.8 -11.6 -1.2
DK 5.5 5.7 6.0 2.5 7.9
EE 1.3 1.1 1.4 -15.4 5.9
EL 11.3 10.9 11.8 -4.0 4.4
ES 46.0 44.8 52.0 -2.6 13.0
FI 5.4 5.5 5.8 2.6 7.6
FR 62.8 66.2 69.5 5.4 10.6
HU 10.0 9.2 9.7 -8.3 -2.7
IE 4.5 4.7 5.3 4.2 18.0
IT 60.3 60.6 67.6 0.5 12.1
LT 3.3 2.8 3.1 -15.2 -5.9
LU 0.5 0.6 0.7 21.4 30.4
LV 2.2 1.8 2.1 -21.4 -5.1
MT 0.4 0.4 0.4 -9.5 4.6
NL 16.6 17.0 18.1 2.6 9.0
PL 38.2 34.8 38.3 -8.8 0.3
PT 10.6 10.0 11.1 -5.8 4.0
RO 21.5 18.0 21.9 -16.0 2.0
SE 9.3 10.3 11.0 10.6 17.5
SI 2.0 2.1 2.3 0.6 10.8
SK 5.4 5.3 5.7 -3.2 5.2
UK 62.0 67.5 70.8 8.8 14.2
Mean -2.7 7.9
Population-weighted mean -2.3 7.4
Note: Own calculations based on population projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied
to EU-SILC data for 2030.
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Table 4: Projected Total Labor Force
Million Workers % Change
Country Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 5.7 5.2 5.6 -7.7 -0.9
BE 7.1 7.3 7.6 1.5 6.3
BG 5.2 3.7 4.6 -28.6 -12.3
CY 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 12.4
CZ 7.4 6.6 7.2 -10.9 -3.5
DE 53.9 43.8 47.9 -18.7 -11.1
DK 3.6 3.5 3.6 -3.3 -0.1
EE 0.9 0.7 0.9 -22.3 -2.2
EL 7.5 7.0 7.4 -7.6 -2.0
ES 31.4 28.9 33.2 -8.0 5.8
FI 3.6 3.3 3.4 -7.6 -5.2
FR 40.7 39.6 40.9 -2.7 0.5
HU 6.9 6.1 6.2 -10.9 -9.1
IE 3.0 2.9 3.4 -3.2 11.5
IT 39.7 38.0 41.5 -4.1 4.8
LT 2.3 1.8 2.0 -21.2 -14.4
LU 0.3 0.4 0.4 16.3 22.7
LV 1.5 1.2 1.4 -25.5 -12.6
MT 0.3 0.2 0.3 -19.6 -8.0
NL 11.1 10.4 10.8 -6.8 -2.8
PL 27.2 22.9 24.5 -16.0 -10.2
PT 7.1 6.5 7.0 -8.3 -1.9
RO 15.0 12.1 14.6 -19.3 -2.8
SE 6.1 6.3 6.6 3.4 8.2
SI 1.4 1.3 1.4 -8.6 -1.0
SK 3.9 3.5 3.7 -10.3 -5.1
UK 41.0 41.7 43.2 1.8 5.5
Mean -9.2 -1.0
Population-weighted mean -8.7 -1.4
Note: Own calculations based on population projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied
to EU-SILC data for 2030.
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Table 5: Skill Shares
Shares Change in % Points
Country Base tough friendly
low med high low med high low med high
AT 22.8% 60.9% 16.3% -4.4 1.9 2.5 -7.1 -2.2 9.3
BE 32.6% 36.7% 30.7% -8.6 2.4 6.2 -10.5 -0.6 11.1
BG 25.4% 55.2% 19.5% -1.4 -1.9 3.3 -7.5 -2.5 10.0
CY 28.7% 39.5% 31.8% -8.0 -1.5 9.5 -12.1 -1.8 14.0
CZ 14.6% 71.0% 14.4% -1.6 -2.8 4.4 -4.6 -5.7 10.3
DE 21.0% 56.6% 22.5% -0.4 -0.5 0.9 -4.2 -3.8 8.0
DK 30.9% 40.6% 28.5% -7.4 -0.6 8.1 -9.3 -4.5 13.8
EE 18.3% 52.0% 29.7% 1.7 -3.9 2.2 -4.5 -4.7 9.2
EL 38.5% 40.5% 21.0% -9.3 4.1 5.2 -11.1 0.6 10.4
ES 48.4% 23.9% 27.7% -8.7 2.2 6.5 -12.0 -0.5 12.5
FI 23.4% 45.6% 31.1% -5.8 1.0 4.9 -7.9 -4.0 11.8
FR 31.8% 41.9% 26.3% -8.5 -0.4 9.0 -10.2 -3.9 14.0
HU 24.3% 58.5% 17.2% -4.7 0.6 4.1 -6.9 -3.0 9.9
IE 29.5% 37.6% 32.9% -7.1 0.9 6.1 -7.8 -2.0 9.7
IT 46.2% 40.8% 13.0% -11.5 7.5 4.0 -9.7 0.3 9.3
LT 16.5% 56.4% 27.1% 0.2 -10.7 10.5 -5.4 -10.0 15.4
LU 29.1% 40.6% 30.3% -4.7 -2.6 7.3 -6.6 -4.9 11.5
LV 19.5% 58.0% 22.5% 1.0 -6.9 5.9 -7.5 -4.1 11.7
MT 71.5% 16.9% 11.6% -11.7 4.9 6.8 -14.4 1.7 12.7
NL 31.4% 40.4% 28.3% -6.6 1.4 5.2 -9.1 -1.3 10.4
PL 17.9% 62.4% 19.7% -4.4 -6.3 10.7 -6.9 -8.9 15.8
PT 67.3% 18.9% 13.8% -14.6 8.0 6.6 -11.3 -1.1 12.4
RO 30.3% 57.9% 11.8% -3.1 -1.9 5.0 -11.0 0.5 10.5
SE 25.7% 46.2% 28.2% -5.2 -2.0 7.2 -8.7 -3.3 12.0
SI 20.8% 58.9% 20.2% -5.7 -1.0 6.7 -5.0 -6.8 11.8
SK 16.0% 68.9% 15.0% -3.3 -1.9 5.2 -5.8 -4.9 10.7
UK 26.9% 43.0% 30.0% -5.2 0.4 4.8 -6.7 -2.9 9.6
Unweighted Avg. -5.5 -0.4 5.9 -8.3 -3.1 11.4
Population weighted Avg. -5.9 0.5 5.4 -8.2 -2.8 11.0
Note: Own calculations based on population projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied
to EU-SILC data for 2030.
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Table 6: Employment Rates
Percent % point change % point change with
wage adj.
Country Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 64.12 -2.62 -1.93 -1.62 0.11
BE 62.70 0.82 1.60 1.43 3.21
BG 72.03 -0.90 1.31 -3.57 -0.69
CY 68.18 1.03 2.22 3.34 4.66
CZ 61.76 0.74 1.89 4.12 6.15
DE 62.77 -2.50 -1.18 -0.70 1.37
DK 76.97 0.68 1.12 1.08 1.92
EE 75.11 -1.49 0.59 -2.25 0.10
EL 59.14 -1.15 -0.52 -0.05 1.28
ES 65.20 -1.39 -0.10 -1.87 0.23
FI 73.25 1.15 1.93 0.96 2.41
FR 66.55 0.34 0.79 -0.02 0.95
HU 62.80 1.24 1.74 -1.56 -0.18
IE 67.01 -0.98 0.48 -1.28 0.14
IT 63.12 0.15 0.02 -1.55 -1.12
LT 69.99 0.74 2.68 -0.45 2.30
LU 64.25 -1.20 -1.22 1.31 2.22
LV 73.08 0.21 1.81 -1.32 1.08
MT 56.83 3.80 4.66 3.79 5.78
NL 68.37 0.29 0.95 0.06 1.43
PL 57.90 2.58 3.76 3.59 5.13
PT 66.47 0.78 0.10 0.69 -0.14
RO 55.57 -1.72 2.06 -0.02 3.66
SE 78.94 1.22 2.01 -1.36 0.13
SI 63.51 -1.72 -1.09 -1.66 -0.55
SK 67.62 0.79 1.75 0.17 3.46
UK 66.82 -0.26 0.58 0.43 1.73
Unweighted average 0.02 1.04 0.06 1.73
Note: Own calculations based on population projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied
to EU-SILC data and labor demand and labor supply elasticities.
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Table 7: Hours worked
Mill. Hours % Change % Change with
wage adj.
Country Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 148.0 -11.1% -3.1% -9.4% 0.1%
BE 177.9 4.7% 11.8% 3.5% 11.3%
BG 179.0 -27.4% -8.6% -30.7% -12.1%
CY 17.0 2.5% 16.7% 2.5% 16.6%
CZ 221.4 -8.6% 1.0% -8.9% 1.8%
DE 1442.5 -20.3% -10.1% -19.8% -9.4%
DK 109.4 -0.3% 3.9% 0.1% 5.2%
EE 29.8 -20.9% 2.3% -23.1% -0.6%
EL 218.1 -9.0% -2.9% -10.0% -3.2%
ES 910.5 -6.2% 9.5% -8.0% 7.7%
FI 110.2 -4.4% -0.3% -5.9% -1.0%
FR 1080.2 -0.2% 4.5% -2.6% 2.6%
HU 188.5 -8.2% -5.0% -14.0% -9.9%
IE 82.1 2.0% 19.0% -0.4% 15.2%
IT 1169.6 1.1% 10.3% -5.0% 4.6%
LT 69.6 -17.6% -7.5% -19.6% -9.1%
LU 9.5 17.3% 24.7% 17.4% 26.1%
LV 51.6 -22.6% -6.5% -25.6% -9.9%
MT 6.7 -12.5% 2.1% -13.7% 1.6%
NL 270.6 -4.6% 0.9% -4.1% 2.2%
PL 745.3 -11.1% -3.2% -12.3% -3.9%
PT 206.5 -4.4% 0.5% -7.1% -1.7%
RO 376.3 -22.3% -0.5% -22.2% -1.3%
SE 177.9 7.0% 13.7% 4.3% 11.8%
SI 40.3 -8.8% 0.0% -10.4% -1.2%
SK 119.5 -7.3% -0.8% -8.1% -0.8%
UK 1033.9 3.1% 8.6% 3.1% 9.1%
Unweighted average -7.0% 3.0% -8.5% 1.9%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor
demand and labor supply elasticities.
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Table 8: Change in original income between 2010 and 2030 (alpha)
Total α αd αw
Country Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 4% 8% -9% -8% 14% 17%
BE 3% 7% -3% -2% 6% 10%
BG -10% -4% -11% -4% 0% 0%
CY 3% 14% -5% -3% 9% 18%
CZ -5% -1% -8% -6% 4% 5%
DE 8% 4% -11% -8% 22% 13%
DK 4% 14% -2% -3% 6% 17%
EE 0% 3% -7% 0% 7% 2%
EL 3% 3% 1% 2% 2% 1%
ES 5% 11% -2% 1% 8% 10%
FI 4% 12% -4% -4% 8% 16%
FR 5% 12% -4% -4% 8% 16%
HU -10% -8% -5% -3% -5% -5%
IE 16% 10% 4% 5% 12% 5%
IT 10% 11% 4% 4% 6% 6%
LT 0% 3% -3% 1% 3% 2%
LU 4% 9% -4% -3% 8% 12%
LV -8% -4% -7% -1% -2% -3%
MT -11% -4% -7% -3% -4% -1%
NL 8% 11% -3% -3% 11% 14%
PL -4% 1% -3% 0% -1% 2%
PT 9% 11% 6% 5% 3% 5%
RO -7% -8% -7% 3% 1% -11%
SE 5% 10% -1% -2% 6% 13%
SI 1% 0% -8% -7% 11% 7%
SK -13% -9% -13% -12% 0% 3%
UK 12% 14% 0% 1% 12% 14%
Average 1% 5% -4% -2% 6% 7%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and EU-
ROMOD version F6.0. α represents the total change in monthly average household original
income between 2010 and 2030. This is decomposed into the part due to demographic change,
αd, and the part due to wage changes, αw.
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Table 9: Decomposition of the change in the Gini coefficient
Total effect Demographic effect Scarcity effect
Gini 1 2 3 4 5 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 3.6% -1.4% 2.7% 3.0% 0.9% -4.4%
BE 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 -0.9% -0.7% -0.5% -1.2% -0.3% 0.5%
BG 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 2.0% 0.9% 0.5% -1.2% 1.6% 2.1%
CY 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 -3.5% -1.0% -1.0% -1.8% -2.5% 0.8%
CZ 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 3.4% 8.2% 3.8% 3.7% -0.4% 4.5%
DE 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 2.7% 0.7% 3.3% 2.6% -0.7% -1.9%
DK 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.27 6.3% 15.5% 2.1% 3.0% 4.2% 12.5%
EE 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 1.8% -0.3% 1.6% 0.7% 0.1% -1.0%
EL 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 1.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.8% 0.9% -0.5%
ES 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 -2.8% -3.8% 1.6% 0.8% -4.3% -4.6%
FI 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 8.0% 12.4% 4.6% 4.9% 3.4% 7.5%
FR 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.5% 2.1% 3.4% 3.3% -3.0% -1.2%
HU 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 -2.9% -5.5% -1.1% -1.2% -1.8% -4.3%
IE 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 -4.2% -5.1% -0.2% -1.3% -4.0% -3.8%
IT 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 2.1% 1.6% 4.1% 4.2% -2.0% -2.6%
LT 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.2% -1.3% 1.2% -0.4% -1.0% -0.9%
LU 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 -2.7% -4.3% 4.2% 3.5% -6.9% -7.9%
LV 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 1.4% -0.9% 3.0% 1.4% -1.7% -2.3%
MT 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.2% 0.4% 1.5% 0.5% -1.4% -0.1%
NL 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 -0.6% 0.9% 1.2% 0.9% -1.8% 0.0%
PL 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 -2.5% -1.1% 0.6% 0.2% -3.1% -1.4%
PT 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.9% 1.3% 8.2% 8.2% -7.3% -6.9%
RO 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.30 -7.4% -12.8% -2.3% -5.6% -5.1% -7.2%
SE 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.28 2.1% 10.4% 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% 10.2%
SI 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 1.9% -3.1% 2.2% 2.4% -0.3% -5.5%
SK 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.27 8.0% 15.0% 5.0% 6.0% 3.0% 9.1%
UK 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 -3.0% -3.4% 0.5% 0.1% -3.5% -3.5%
Average 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.6% 0.9% 1.9% 1.4% -1.3% -0.5%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and
EUROMOD version F6.0. Column 1 shows the baseline scenario (2010). Column 2 shows
the 2030 tough scenario without wage adjustment. Column 3 shows the 2030 friendly scenario
without wage adjustment. Column 4 shows the 2030 tough scenario with wage adjustment.
Column 5 shows the 2030 friendly scenario with wage adjustment.
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Table 10: Decomposition of the change in the P90/P50 ratio
Total effect Demographic effect Scarcity effect
P90/50 1 2 3 4 5 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 1.74 1.75 1.77 1.79 1.70 2.7% -2.1% 0.8% 1.6% 1.9% -3.7%
BE 1.69 1.67 1.67 1.65 1.68 -2.3% -0.1% -1.2% -1.2% -1.1% 1.1%
BG 2.20 2.22 2.24 2.28 2.33 3.9% 5.8% 0.9% 1.7% 3.0% 4.1%
CY 1.98 2.12 2.12 2.05 2.24 3.7% 12.9% 7.2% 6.9% -3.4% 6.0%
CZ 1.76 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.95 6.1% 10.3% 5.8% 6.1% 0.3% 4.2%
DE 1.85 1.89 1.89 1.91 1.86 3.0% 0.5% 2.2% 2.4% 0.8% -1.9%
DK 1.61 1.62 1.64 1.71 1.86 6.1% 15.2% 0.8% 1.6% 5.4% 13.6%
EE 2.05 2.09 2.11 2.07 2.05 1.1% -0.1% 1.7% 2.7% -0.6% -2.8%
EL 2.13 2.15 2.17 2.16 2.18 1.2% 2.3% 0.9% 1.7% 0.4% 0.6%
ES 2.02 2.10 2.09 1.99 1.97 -1.1% -2.4% 4.3% 3.6% -5.4% -5.9%
FI 1.78 1.81 1.83 1.87 1.97 5.3% 10.7% 2.0% 3.0% 3.3% 7.7%
FR 1.83 1.86 1.87 1.81 1.85 -1.2% 1.2% 1.4% 2.0% -2.5% -0.7%
HU 1.80 1.77 1.78 1.72 1.69 -4.4% -6.4% -1.9% -1.1% -2.5% -5.3%
IE 1.86 1.80 1.79 1.78 1.78 -4.5% -4.3% -3.2% -3.7% -1.2% -0.6%
IT 1.98 2.03 2.04 1.99 2.00 0.8% 0.8% 2.7% 3.1% -1.9% -2.3%
LT 2.32 2.31 2.27 2.29 2.28 -1.2% -1.4% -0.2% -2.0% -0.9% 0.5%
LU 1.76 1.82 1.81 1.71 1.72 -2.6% -2.1% 3.4% 3.2% -6.0% -5.2%
LV 2.34 2.44 2.41 2.45 2.43 4.8% 3.8% 4.1% 2.8% 0.7% 0.9%
MT 2.00 2.09 2.09 2.01 2.04 0.5% 1.7% 4.1% 4.5% -3.6% -2.9%
NL 1.79 1.81 1.81 1.78 1.80 -0.3% 0.7% 1.3% 1.1% -1.6% -0.4%
PL 2.06 2.05 2.07 1.99 2.06 -3.5% -0.1% -0.2% 0.5% -3.3% -0.6%
PT 2.44 2.77 2.77 2.25 2.32 -7.7% -5.0% 13.7% 13.6% -21.5% -18.6%
RO 2.03 1.94 1.91 1.86 1.78 -8.1% -12.1% -4.2% -5.7% -3.9% -6.4%
SE 1.70 1.72 1.73 1.73 1.89 1.8% 11.3% 1.2% 1.9% 0.5% 9.4%
SI 1.83 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.76 2.5% -4.0% 2.3% 2.2% 0.2% -6.2%
SK 1.68 1.78 1.79 1.81 1.92 7.6% 14.3% 5.9% 6.5% 1.7% 7.8%
UK 2.14 2.15 2.15 2.07 2.07 -3.3% -3.1% 0.3% 0.7% -3.6% -3.7%
Average 1.94 1.98 1.98 1.94 1.97 0.4% 1.8% 2.1% 2.2% -1.7% -0.4%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and
EUROMOD version F6.0. Column 1 shows the baseline scenario (2010). Column 2 shows
the 2030 tough scenario without wage adjustment. Column 3 shows the 2030 friendly scenario
without wage adjustment. Column 4 shows the 2030 tough scenario with wage adjustment.
Column 5 shows the 2030 friendly scenario with wage adjustment.
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Table 11: Decomposition of the change in the P10/P50 ratio
Total effect Demographic effect Scarcity effect
P10/50 1 2 3 4 5 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.2% 0.0% -0.6% 0.2% 0.9% -0.3%
BE 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 -3.4% -1.4% -3.6% -2.3% 0.2% 0.9%
BG 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.49 1.0% 3.8% 3.8% 5.5% -2.8% -1.6%
CY 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.6% 2.5% 4.1% 3.1% -3.5% -0.6%
CZ 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.65 1.6% 3.0% 3.2% 3.8% -1.6% -0.8%
DE 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 -2.0% -0.2% -2.5% -0.8% 0.5% 0.5%
DK 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 -1.1% 0.4% -2.3% -2.3% 1.2% 2.7%
EE 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.50 -0.6% 0.8% 2.1% 2.3% -2.7% -1.6%
EL 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 -1.0% -0.3% -1.3% -0.8% 0.2% 0.5%
ES 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 8.6% 7.5% 6.1% 6.1% 2.5% 1.4%
FI 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.58 -0.8% 2.9% 0.8% 1.2% -1.5% 1.7%
FR 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 -1.7% -1.1% -2.5% -2.4% 0.8% 1.3%
HU 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 -2.7% -3.1% -1.3% -0.4% -1.4% -2.7%
IE 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.54 1.9% 0.0% -4.0% -4.3% 5.8% 4.3%
IT 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 -4.9% -4.9% -3.9% -3.7% -1.0% -1.2%
LT 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.50 -0.6% -1.0% -2.0% 2.3% 1.4% -3.4%
LU 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 1.2% 2.6% -2.1% -1.2% 3.3% 3.9%
LV 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.47 -1.6% 4.6% 3.6% 5.7% -5.2% -1.1%
MT 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.54 3.3% 4.9% 4.8% 6.3% -1.4% -1.5%
NL 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 -3.6% -4.8% -2.6% -2.9% -1.0% -1.8%
PL 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 2.6% 3.5% 3.3% 4.2% -0.7% -0.7%
PT 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.43 -9.0% -5.4% -1.3% -1.1% -7.7% -4.3%
RO 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39 -6.8% -0.7% -5.4% 0.0% -1.3% -0.7%
SE 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.9% 4.6% 1.4% 1.8% -0.5% 2.8%
SI 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 1.4% -1.4% -1.3% -1.5% 2.7% 0.1%
SK 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 3.7% 4.7% 4.8% 5.1% -1.1% -0.3%
UK 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 -1.9% -1.2% -1.6% -1.6% -0.3% 0.4%
Average 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 -0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% -0.5% -0.1%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and
EUROMOD version F6.0. Column 1 shows the baseline scenario (2010). Column 2 shows
the 2030 tough scenario without wage adjustment. Column 3 shows the 2030 friendly scenario
without wage adjustment. Column 4 shows the 2030 tough scenario with wage adjustment.
Column 5 shows the 2030 friendly scenario with wage adjustment.
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Table 12: Decomposition of the change in FGT0
Total effect Demographic effect Scarcity effect
FGT0 1 2 3 4 5 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 4.9% -0.1% 3.2% 2.1% 1.8% -2.2%
BE 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 14.8% 6.8% 15.8% 15.0% -1.0% -8.3%
BG 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.19 2.2% -1.3% -4.2% -6.4% 6.5% 5.1%
CY 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 4.2% 3.5% 6.6% 8.5% -2.4% -5.0%
CZ 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -11.1% -17.2% -14.8% -18.8% 3.8% 1.6%
DE 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 4.2% 4.1% 6.2% 4.0% -2.0% 0.1%
DK 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 3.8% 4.2% 8.7% 8.8% -5.0% -4.6%
EE 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 5.4% 1.9% -5.9% -7.4% 11.3% 9.3%
EL 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 -2.3% -1.7% -2.0% -1.6% -0.3% 0.0%
ES 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 5.8% 5.3% 8.4% 7.1% -2.6% -1.7%
FI 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 5.1% -11.7% -0.5% -1.3% 5.6% -10.4%
FR 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.3% -6.3% -0.5% -2.6% 0.8% -3.7%
HU 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 3.2% 0.5% -0.7% -4.6% 3.9% 5.1%
IE 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.20 27.2% 21.7% 26.8% 36.5% 0.4% -14.7%
IT 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.4% -0.3% 1.6% 2.0% -1.2% -2.2%
LT 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 2.9% 2.2% -4.9% -9.6% 7.8% 11.8%
LU 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 -6.4% -5.4% -0.9% -2.3% -5.4% -3.1%
LV 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.22 15.3% 7.0% 4.7% 3.3% 10.6% 3.7%
MT 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 -4.1% -10.7% -6.3% -16.8% 2.2% 6.1%
NL 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 13.4% 17.7% 11.3% 12.0% 2.1% 5.7%
PL 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 -6.6% -6.7% -5.0% -7.1% -1.7% 0.4%
PT 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.25 21.9% 14.2% 8.0% 8.0% 13.9% 6.3%
RO 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 -1.0% -7.6% 2.0% -4.4% -3.0% -3.2%
SE 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 -0.2% -14.1% -6.7% -8.5% 6.4% -5.6%
SI 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 -4.3% -4.4% -3.5% -3.8% -0.8% -0.6%
SK 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 -14.9% -19.0% -21.0% -22.3% 6.1% 3.4%
UK 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 -0.6% -1.8% 2.9% 2.0% -3.5% -3.8%
Average 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 3.1% -0.7% 1.1% -0.3% 2.0% -0.4%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and
EUROMOD version F6.0. Column 1 shows the baseline scenario (2010). Column 2 shows
the 2030 tough scenario without wage adjustment. Column 3 shows the 2030 friendly scenario
without wage adjustment. Column 4 shows the 2030 tough scenario with wage adjustment.
Column 5 shows the 2030 friendly scenario with wage adjustment.
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Table 13: Decomposition of the change in FGT1
Total effect Demographic effect Scarcity effect
FGT1 1 2 3 4 5 Tough Friendly Tough Friendly Tough Friendly
AT 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 4.7% 3.7% 12.1% 9.5% -7.3% -5.9%
BE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 7.1% 2.7% 3.7% 1.3% 3.5% 1.4%
BG 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 7.7% -2.6% -1.9% -9.6% 9.6% 7.0%
CY 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -4.0% -8.9% -4.5% -4.1% 0.5% -4.8%
CZ 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -9.8% -18.8% -13.5% -19.0% 3.7% 0.2%
DE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 5.5% 7.5% 19.5% 14.3% -14.0% -6.8%
DK 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 4.3% 3.0% 3.0% 4.3% 1.3% -1.3%
EE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.1% -4.3% -6.0% -9.4% 7.0% 5.1%
EL 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 -6.3% -8.4% -6.3% -7.7% 0.0% -0.7%
ES 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 -7.0% -8.2% -4.1% -6.1% -2.9% -2.0%
FI 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 6.9% -6.3% -2.1% -4.6% 9.0% -1.7%
FR 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 2.8% -9.8% 9.5% 7.2% -6.7% -16.9%
HU 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 18.2% 15.7% 9.9% 4.5% 8.3% 11.2%
IE 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -8.1% -4.9% 10.8% 11.9% -18.9% -16.8%
IT 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 4.7% 4.7% 1.6% 2.2% 3.1% 2.6%
LT 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.9% -7.1% -1.2% -11.0% 2.1% 3.9%
LU 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -2.4% -16.5% 16.2% 13.8% -18.6% -30.3%
LV 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 11.6% 0.5% 1.0% -4.5% 10.6% 5.0%
MT 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 12.7% -8.8% -0.8% -12.7% 13.5% 3.8%
NL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -7.6% -9.5% -1.9% -2.4% -5.8% -7.2%
PL 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -8.7% -12.4% -8.3% -11.9% -0.4% -0.4%
PT 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 33.1% 19.2% 8.2% 6.0% 24.9% 13.2%
RO 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 7.0% -4.8% 5.9% -6.1% 1.1% 1.3%
SE 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -3.5% -15.9% -6.1% -8.5% 2.6% -7.4%
SI 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -1.0% 3.1% 0.5% 0.2% -1.5% 3.0%
SK 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 7.0% -3.6% -0.8% -4.8% 7.8% 1.2%
UK 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -2.6% -5.5% 1.6% -0.3% -4.1% -5.2%
Average 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 2.8% -3.6% 1.7% -1.8% 1.1% -1.8%
Note: Own calculations based on EM input datasets reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and
EUROMOD version F6.0. Column 1 shows the baseline scenario (2010). Column 2 shows
the 2030 tough scenario without wage adjustment. Column 3 shows the 2030 friendly scenario
without wage adjustment. Column 4 shows the 2030 tough scenario with wage adjustment.
Column 5 shows the 2030 friendly scenario with wage adjustment.
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